material things. Their actual heresy was in denying the efficacy of the sacraments unless administered by Catholic priests. Because of their antisocial views, they were punished by secular authorities also. Innocent III attempted to reconvert these heretical groups but failing in this, he summoned a Crusade against the Albigensians in Toulouse. The Capetian rulers of France, seeing an opportunity to gain territory and wealth, assisted the Crusade; the heresey was almost completely stamped out, and the rich territories of Toulouse and Langedoc were added to the French domain.

CHURCH-STATE RIVALRY

The problem of the authority of the Church and pope and the temporal rulers goes all the way back to the fifth century when Pope Leo the Great envisaged a Christian commonwealth with spiritual matters in control of the priests, bishop, and the pope (who was a successor of Peter and head of the apostolic Church). But by the mid-eleventh century the reality was quite different. In the Holy Roman Empire the emperors selected their churchmen and used them extensively in the administration of government; in France the Church provided warriors for the feudal armies and shrewd political advisers for feudal princes. Under these conditions the Church neglected its sacred mission. The clergy was often corrupt; eccelesiastical offices--including the office of the pope--were frequently sold to the highest bidder.

In the mid-eleventh century, as was mentioned earlier, a powerful movement of ecclesiastical reform took place. This started with the Cluniac reform in the tenth century, which called for enforcement of clerical celibacy and the abolition of simony. In 1049 Pope Leo IX started a reform movement that culminated, under Nicholas II, in the Decree of 1059, by which the pope was elected by the cardinals. The most dramatic event in this struggle over ecclesiastical appointments came when Hildebrand, now designated as Pope Gregory VII, issued a proclamation banning lay investiture (traditionally, a newly chosen bishop or abbot was invested by a lay lord with a ring and pastoral staff symbolic of his office). This proclamation was equivalent to declaring war against Europe's rulers. Henry IV of Germany refused to accept the decree and sent a flaming letter of defiance asserting his right as a divinely appointed sovereign to lead the German Church without papal interference. Gregory VII responded by excommunicating and deposing Henry. Clearly, the issue had gone far beyond the question of investiture. Altar and throne were engaged in a struggle for supremacy in Christendom. Pressure was brought to bear on Henry by churchmen and laymen in Germany. Crossing the Alps to Canossa to seek the Pope's forgiveness, Henry IV, humble and barefoot in the snow and clothed in penitential garments, waited for three days until Gregory lifted Henry's excommunication, and the monarch promised to amend his ways. Henry returned to his throne, and in 1085 Gregory was forced to give up the papacy and died in exile.

The problem of lay investiture was settled in 1122 at the Concordat of Worms. The Church maintained the right to approve, if not to choose, the holder of a clerical office; for example, a bishop was invested by the king as a feudal official and was consecrated by the archbishop, who gave him his ring and pastoral staff, which symbolized his spiritual functions.

The papacy reached its zenith in the thirteenth century under Pope Innocent III (1198-1216)--history's most powerful pope. A brilliant, astute, and self-confident aristocrat (who held an exalted view of his office), he forced John of England into complete submission in the appointment of the Archbishop of Canterbury and papal lordship of England, forced Philip Augustus of France to comply with the Church's moral code by taking back as his queen the woman he had divorced, and played an important role in Germany in the choosing of the Emperor Frederick II as a ruler in a disputed election.

After the death of Innocent III, the power of the papacy in political matters declined. Its deep involvement in secular affairs was tarnishing its spiritual authority. In the centuries that followed serious divisions weakened the Church, and charges of corruption were increasingly made against Church officials. These conditions finally led to the Protestant Revolt in the sixteenth century.

THE CRUSADES

For centuries Christians had made pilgrimages to the Holy Land. Then, during the eleventh century a new warlike tribe, the Seljuk Turks, swept across Persia, took up the Islamic faith, and in the battle at Manzikert in 1079, seized control of Asia Minor from the Byzantines. Stories filtered into Europe of the atrocities committed against Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem. When Alexius Comnenus, the Byzantine emperor, appealed to the West for help, Pope Urban II grasped the opportunity to send the First Crusade. In an address to the Frankish aristocracy at Clermont, he delivered an emotional plea to avenge the Turkish atrocities and win the Biblical "land of milk and honey." With shouts of "Got wills it," the response was overwhelming. A great army under the leadership of feudal knights from France, Norwandy, and Sicily marched to Constantinople. Detached by an anxious Comnenus to Asia Minor, they captured ancient Antioch and in 1099 took Jerusalem. Four Crusader states were organized: the county of Edessa, the principality of Antioch, the county of Tripolis, and the kingdom of Jerusalem. No other Crusade was to have the success of this First Crusade.

The Second Crusade (1147-48) was organized largely through the efforts of St. Bernard of Clairvaux. The Crusade, led by King Louis VII of France and Emperor Conrad III of Germany, met with many misfortunes and ended when the Crusaders failed to capture Damascus. The Third Crusade (1189-92) was led by three of Europe's kings:Emperor Frederick Barbarossa of

Germany, King Philip Augustus of France, and Richard the Lion-Hearted of England. Barbarossa was drowned while crossing the Seleucid River in Asia Minor; Philip Augustus returned home to France to plot against Richard and the English; only Richard remained to encounter Saladin, who had taken Jerusalem in 1187, and arrange a truce to allow pilgrims to visit Jerusalem. The Fourth Crusade (1201-04) was chiefly supported by Pope Innocent III. In order to reach Constantinople by water, the Crusaders, led by Baldwin IX of Flanders, arranged with the Venetians to transport them. On the way they captured the city of Zara for the Venetians. Instead of pursuing the goal of capturing Jerusalem, the Crusaders captured Constantinople in 1204 and placed their own ruler on the Byzantine throne, thus completely perverting the purposes for which the Crusades were originally started.

There were later Crusades, but they were unsuccessful in capturing Jerusalem. In 1291 the last Christian territory fell to the Muslims, bringing an end to the Crusader states. But the Crusades had other important results: Trade and commerce were greatly increased, and many new products were introduced into Western Europe. The knights and barons broadened their perspective by contacts with other civilizations. Several semi-monastic orders--including the Knights Templars (who became powerful and wealthy), the Hospitallers, and the Teutonic Knights--were established to fight the Muslims and advance the cause of the Crusades.

CONCLUSION

The period of the High Middle Ages was a time of transition and vast change. As such, it cannot be encapsulated in a brief introduction; indeed, a series of books could scarcely unravel its essential complexity. The period from 1000 to 1350 witnessed a remarkable growth in economics, population, and material goods. In their wake arose social change and dislocation, the need for new political forms, and that tension which must invariably find its manifestation, if not its resolution, in the activity and thought of man.

The new powers in church and state found their way in conflict as tradition and innovation were brusquely brought together in a strained partnership of sacred and secular. Class consciousness grew apace as money and land vied for supremacy; burghers of the city sought independence and political voice; nobles of the countryside sought to preserve their diminishing prestige and stature. And men of the lowest classes fought to free themselves from the harness of feudal necessity and to make their way in a society which seemed to promise more reward for individual endeavor as cultural horizons expanded.

In such a situation it is not surprising that action and reaction should take extreme forms. Far from following the "Golden Mean" of the Greek ideal, the men of the Middle Ages seemed willing to court disaster at every turn; never had men built higher, traveled farther, or disagreed

more. Righteousness and interest combined, and the tools of war found frequent use. On one hand, the frenzy of activity which proceeded from the pains of birth seems schizophrenic to the later observer, and the developments such as the Chivalric Code appear almost paranoic in nature. Everywhere in the period the student of history finds sinister and ominous undertones hiding behind pious or optimistic appearances; everywhere the petals of the rose obscure the thorns which lie beneath the beauty. On the other hand, it may be that one cannot have the first without the second; perhaps great change--some would call it "progress"--must bring with it inevitable harshness.

By the fourteenth century the more fully amalgamated peoples of the West had created a society of magnificent form and beauty; yet, for all its accomplishment, that society was still quite crude and ignorant. Here the metaphor of western frontier life with which we began stands us in good stead in explaining the paradox of the rose and the thorn; the civilization of the High Middle Ages was a *new* society, its members a pioneer group just struggling out of a long past of bitter toil for a bare subsistence. Through their actions they changed the world and were, themselves, changed by it. Their legacy, for good or evil, became our inheritance.

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PHILOSOPHY - RELIGION

ARABIC COMMENTATORS ON ARISTOTLE

For 1,100 years Christian theology had been dominated by Platonic thought and for most of that time had not known Aristotle, except for his logic. Aristotle's writings, however, had been preserved in the East. They had been translated into Armenian and Persian by the end of the fifth century and later into Syriac. In the eighth century they were passed on to Baghdad and translated into Arabic by the Moslems; from there they were carried by the Moslem invasions into Spain, where they were translated into Latin and discovered by the Christian scholars in the twelfth century.

The Arabic scholars, therefore, knew not only Plato but also Aristotle. The Moslems had developed a strong Platonic outlook at Alexandria under such men as the Jewish scholar Philo (first century A.D.), but their view was largely derived from Plotinus, the Neo-Platonist who held that the universe was created by emanations from God's fullness. However, the Moslems had the same kind of troubles reconciling Plato with the Hebrew-Christian views as had the Christians.

The most important of the Arabic scholars were Avicenna (980-1036), Al-Gazzali (1058-1111), and Averrhoes (1126-1198). Avicenna combined the views of Aristotle and Plotinus with those of Christianity. Plotinus' emanations from God's fullness become the method by which the Christian God creates what Aristotle called the "active intellect," which, in turn, creates human souls and governs the world of nature as known to us. But Avicenna avoided the pantheism of Plotinus (God's being everything) by saying that matter exists as a principle of pure potentiality independent of God but is made actual by the activity of God. Thus Avicenna retained Aristotle's idea of an eternal universe but saw it as potential rather than actual.

Al-Gazzali vehemently denounced this Aristotelianism of Avicenna and demanded an unconditional surrender of reason to faith. He favored the Neo-Platonic mystic vision beyond reason. Averrhoes' views, on the other hand, resembled those of Avicenna. He returned to the more Aristotelian view of the eternal nature of the material universe; he adopted Aristotle's position that it is the universal "active intellect" or "active reason" which is eternal and not the individual soul, which ceases to exist at death.

Thus the conflict between Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy and Christian theology was fully set. Aristotle's view that the universe is eternal, matter uncreated (a second eternal reality over against God), and personal immortality impossible was in direct conflict with Christian principles. This view became mixed with the Neo-Platonic pantheistic view that the universe is a series of emanations or overflow from the fullness of divine being. Fundamental in this conflict was the issue between natural philosophical reason and the propositions of Christian faith in the revelation in Christ and the scriptures.

The Aristotelian interest in natural science, however, was growing strongly and would not be opposed. What the Church had to do, therefore, was somehow to expurgate the Aristotelian metaphysics--the eternal nature of the universe and the mortality of the soul--while approving the interest in natural science and rational thought based on observation in nature insofar as such interest did not lead to conflicts with revealed theology. Aristotle's *Physics* was banned in Europe in 1209, and the *Metaphysics* was banned in 1215, but by the middle of the thirteenth century they were both being taught (with some emendations) at the University of Paris.

A crucial issue between Aristotle and Plato was focused on the nature of the universals. While both agreed that the universals are real, Plato argued that they have a separate reality and are the only things of which we have knowledge that are genuinely real, while Aristotle argued that they are always embodied in the particular, individual realities and not separate at all. This argument had been complicated by men like Roscellinus and the nominalists who argued that the universals are not real at all but only names--nominals--for characteristis which individual things share in common and which the mind recognizes and gives names to. As we pointed out in the preceding unit, this had set the two great problems for medieval thought: Philosophy had to save the individuals and their worth, while not unduly exalting them so as to reduce the church and the state (universals) to mere conveniences. It also had to save the church and the state (universals) as substantial realities without reducing the individuals to accidental and valueless moments of the universals. The other problem was to reconcile revelation and faith with natural reason. These problems were now forced by the arrival in Europe of Aristotle, with his aggravating doctrines of eternal matter and the mortality of the soul, to say nothing of his interest in natural science.

ABELARD (1079-1142)

The solution to the first problem was found by Abelard, whose love for Heloise has given him a fame far beyond that which he would have had only as a theologian, although his role in philosophy at this juncture assured him of a significant place in history.

Abelard rejected the extreme positions of the universalist controversy and tried to reconcile them in a mediating position much as Aristotle had

done with Plato and the atomists. Abelard held that the mind constructs real abstract universal concepts that are, as such, only constructs of the mind; but they are, nevertheless, not merely names for superficial appearances of similarities that individual things have in common but also concepts for general characteristics or properties that individual objects actually possess in common--real universal properties. These properties then really do exist and exist in all particulars, but are found only in the particulars. The fact that we can form universal concepts is proof that the objects have universal properties, hence that there is something universally real that is represented in the concepts. But this does not require that there be a universal reality with a separate existence for each universal concept. For instance, each individual has the power to reason. Rationality, therefore, is a real thing and universally present in mankind even though found only in individuals, so that rationality is not merely a name for an empty concept, nor is it a separate reality.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (1225-1275)

The stage was now set for Thomas Aquinas, who ranks with Plato and Aristotle in the history of Western philosophy, and like them, gave a definitive answer to the problems of his age. These were not simply theological problems. Theological problems had never been "just" theological. But now there were new forces moving in the world. The very rationalism that the Church, or at least the philosophical theologians in the Church, had nourished, was breaking loose from the Church and its orthodoxy. The universities were emerging and growing in influence, there was a new interest in natural science per se, and there were new art forms abroad. The West had been exposed to the works of the Moslem philosophers and Moslem art, as well as to such ancients as Aristotle who had been lost to the West for many centuries but were now reintroduced to Europe by the Moslems.

The chief impact of the rediscovery of the ancient classic world of Greek thought lay in its being a naturalistic rationalism, free from subservience to theological-religious interest and faith in a supernatural revelation, and in Aristotle's interest in natural science. It was a world which believed that natural happiness is the proper end of mankind, while the Christian world believed in the final happiness of those elected to salvation. For the Christian it was a supernatural gift and not a natural achievement. The issue bluntly stated was between naturalism and supernaturalism. The interest of people in this life in this world, in everything from art to medicine, was moving strongly in the world. Natural reason in its new interest in natural science was breaking free from theology and from the support of dogma. In the classic view, while people fell short of it, the ideal was human dignity and nobility, while in the Christian view people were by nature "fallen," willfully wicked and ignoble, and incapable of anything else without the grace of God. It was Thomas' task to reconcile these views, and that he did so for his generation constitutes his greatness.

To begin with, Thomas avoided the position of those who held that reason as philosophy is independent of revelation, treating of subjects of nature, while revelation and faith have to do with divine matters. He asserted, rather, the orthodox view that the truths known in revelation are prior to the activity of reason and provide the beginning axioms from which philosophy proceeds. As in other disciplines, for instance mathematics, the axioms are taken as self-evident and not to be argued or proved but used as the starting point or beginning for reasoning, so also the truths of revelation and faith are axiomatic for rational philosophy. Thus philosophy is subordinate to faith. Beyond this distinction between philosophy and theology (faith) Thomas made a distinction between revealed and natural theology, the latter being that part which can be proved by natural reason, and thus provided an overlapping of faith and reason, theology and philosophy. Thus he held not only that they cannot be in conflict but also that revelation supplements reason, for the matters of revelation lie beyond, not in conflict with, reason.

Having thus established to his own satisfaction the freedom of philosophy, Thomas adopted the Aristotelian position against the Neo-Platonists, holding that the universe is a collection of individual substances existing in terms of the combination of matter and form. Thus the Creator and the created universe are one continuous hierarchy and not two separate orders. It was on this basis that Thomas' two basic principles rested--that theology and philosophy are not in conflict, and that grace perfects nature while revelation supplements reason. Aristotle's God, you remember, is cosmic intelligence, pure actuality, pure form, and thus is always in some measure present in the particulars as potentiality, as inspiring the universe's movement toward the actualization (form) of its potential (matter). Thus, according to Thomas, reason and revelation unite to make known to us more fully the nature and character of God as he reaches down to people to draw them to himself and to the perfection of their divine sonship.

This move, of course, simultaneously solved the problem of the relation between universals and particulars by the use of the Aristotelian individual substance as a combination of form and matter in the individual so that universals are not separate realities but are, nevertheless, real in the particulars.

Concerning the existence of God, Thomas held that it could be proved by natural reason and gave five "proofs." The first was the argument from motion. All things in nature that are in motion are moved by something other than themselves--acted upon by some force outside of themselves; the wind moves the leaf, the sun and the rain set the life forces in motion. All motion involves change from potentiality to some new actuality. That which causes the motion must be some actuality; e.g., actual heat makes wood or paper, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot. Thus the actualities which move other things from their potential state to their new actual state must be other than what is moved, so that the mover and the moved must be two different things, as wind and fire are different from leaf and wood. Thus if the wind is moved, it too must be moved by something else, and it in its turn moved by something else, and

so with fire, and so on. But this cannot go on forever, or there would be no motion at all, because there would be nothing in the beginning to set anything in motion. Thus there must be something which itself is not in motion which, nevertheless, causes all other motion--contains within itself the initial power to move. This everyone understands as God.

The second argument was from the nature of efficient cause. This follows the same reasoning as the argument from motion and is, in fact, only a variant of it. An efficient cause is that which actually produces an effect and is immediate to it. Every effect requires such a cause, and it in its turn requires such a cause, and it in its turn another, and so on. Thus we must posit again an uncaused cause capable of setting all cause in motion.

The third argument was from possibility and necessity. All things in nature exist through something else already existing--oaks from acorns, kittens from cats, thought from sensation, etc. But if everything in the universe is dependent--contingent--on something else also contingent in its turn on something else contingent, then there must have been a time when nothing existed, from which it follows that nothing could ever have been brought into existence. It follows that there must be something eternal whose being is "necessary" and not capable of not-being, upon which all possible contingent beings rest and from which, by efficient cause and motion, they proceed and are the effects. Such a necessary being is God.

The fourth argument is from gradation of being, or degrees found in things. Some things are more and some less good, true, beautiful, and so on. But this "more" and "less" are predicated not just in contrast to each other but in respect to some maximum, so that there is something that is most true, most beautiful, and most good. The maximum of any genus is the "cause" of all that genus; as "mankind" (human nature) is the "cause" of all individual persons, so "truth" is the "cause" of all truths, and so "heat" is the "cause" of all degrees of temperature. Thus there must be something which is ultimate being, ultimate truth, ultimate goodness, ultimate power, ultimate life, ultimate wisdom. That ultimate is God and must exist.

The fifth argument is from the governance of the world. We observe some things that lack intelligence and knowledge but, nevertheless, act for an end. The begonia tuber moves to become a begonia flower, and does so not erratically, haphazardly, and accidentally but regularly and dependably, that is, by design. If it lacks the knowledge and design of an intelligent being, then it must be designed and directed by some other being of intelligence, as the arrow is directed by the archer to its end. As all natural beings, including some intelligent beings such as people, move to some ends not determined by their own intelligence, all natural things must in such matters be directed by some supreme intelligence, that is, God. Hence God must exist.

Whether or not we accept Thomas' arguments depends perhaps on whether or not we feel we need such answers as he developed to the question of

origins and whether or not we feel such answers are possible. It may appear reasonable that to take care of the practical affairs of every day and the concerns of science we need only to know about efficient (immediate) causes of things, motions, degrees, and so on; that to know of final or original causes, degrees, etc. makes no real difference to us. We may hold that it is not possible anyway because all we do know are finite causes, motions, and degrees, and inferences concerning them, and that we can have no knowledge, even by inference, of the system as a whole.

On the other hand, in science we infer from specifics to the whole class, from the species to the genus, when, in fact, we have never observed and thus never know the class as a whole or the genus as a whole. Furthermore, it can be argued that while science meets the limited demands of the mind for knowledge and the ordering of the facts and processes of nature, there is also another interest of the mind in such questions as we have been considering which needs to be met and has some proper claim on thought. It may be argued even further that such interests have very important consequences in the area of human behavior, as the conflict in the area of ethics clearly demonstrates. If there are only proximate, immediate, and efficient causes for our actions, then right and wrong are to be settled on a moment-to-moment situational basis; but if there are universal, ultimate, divine causes and ends and directing intelligence, then right and wrong must transcend the momentary and the proximate, so that at least Thomas' effort is justified whether his effort in particular succeeds or not.

An important aspect of Thomas' work was his method, which came to be characteristic of Scholasticism. He would first list objections to his view, and then state the contrary views. Next he would state his own view, which was presumed to reconcile the opposing views, and finally he would reply, in terms of his reconciliation, to each of the objections with which he began.

So that you may catch the full sense of this method we quote here, with small emendations, his first article on the question of whether anything like revelation is needed beyond natural philosophy.

> *Objection 1. It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge, for man should not seek to know what is above reason. . . .*
>
> *Objection 2. Further, knowledge can be concerned only with being, for nothing can be known, save what is. . . . But everything that is, is treated of in philosophical science--even God himself. . . .*
>
> *On the contrary, it is written. . . "All scripture inspired of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice." Now scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science . . . . Therefore it is useful that besides philosophical science there should be other knowledge--i.e., inspired of God.*